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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to discuss how pupils’ exposure to religious and life-stance 
diversity should be organized through the formal curriculum of public education in order to 
best foster tolerance. The article examines two proposals: the Integrated French model and 
the Norwegian religious education model. In view of normative considerations and 
considerations of effectiveness, it argues that although each model has its merits, they are both 
problematic because they in different ways fail to adequately balance the need for relevant 
exposure to religious and life-stance diversity with sufficient neutrality. By taking the 
Norwegian model as a point of departure, the article concludes by proposing two 
improvements - one calling for a sufficiently neutral value basis, and the other for a more 
mindful use of educational methods. 
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Introduction 
Western liberal democracies are characterized by religious and life-stance diversity in the 
sense that its citizens hold a variety of conceptions of the good.1 It seems reasonable to 
assume that in order to sustain peaceful coexistence, stability and social unity in liberal 
societies with this type of diversity, mutual tolerance among citizens would be beneficial. It is 
furthermore a fair assumption that public education has a significant role to play in the 
promotion of tolerance for different religions and life stances, and that some kind of exposure 
to religious and life-stance diversity through public education is a useful means in this regard. 
This view is supported by a consensus in Europe that there is an increasing need for 
strengthening the knowledge about religions and life stances in public education. This is 
clearly expressed by both the Council of Europe 2 and by the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).3 How and to what extent this exposure should take place, 
however, is disputed among politicians, educational scholars as well as political philosophers, 
and it is a question which has been high on the agenda in most western democracies in the last 
decades. Exposure to religions and life stances in public education can take place within the 
formal curriculum, but also outside of it, for instance through the mere fact of pupils and 
teachers adhering to different religions and life stances spending time together. Brighouse 
suggests that we probably learn more about different ways of life through encounters with 
others, who live differently from us, than we do through the formal curriculum.4 Without 
denying the importance of such (extracurricular) exposure, this does not exclude the 
importance of the formal curriculum in the promotion of tolerance. The scope of this article 
will be limited to exposure as conceived within the formal curriculum. 
The article discusses how pupils’ exposure to religious and life-stance diversity should 
be organized through the formal curriculum of public education in order to best foster 
tolerance. The discussion will be based upon an examination of two different European 
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models for organizing exposure to religions and life stances in public education: the 
Integrated French model and the Norwegian religious education model as seen in the 
religious education subject known as RLE (“Religion, livssyn og etikk” [“Religion, Life 
Stance and Ethics”]).5 These models share the view that exposure to religions and life stances 
can have positive effects upon pupil’s ability to understand other religions and life stances and 
their adherents, and consequently upon the promotion of tolerance. Both models also have a 
“religious studies” approach to teaching about religions and life stances in the sense that 
teaching is non-confessional, and that the training and facilitating process of teachers and the 
development of curricula is the responsibility of the state.6 In the French model this state 
responsibility is exclusive, whereas the Norwegian model permits some cooperation with 
religious communities. Moreover, the two models differ when it comes to degree of exposure 
and how this exposure is organized in terms of subject structure, substance and educational 
methods as well as with respect to the national educational systems of which they are a part. 
The Integrated French model seeks to promote tolerance through objective knowledge about 
religions and life stances, not in a separate religious education subject, but integrated into 
subjects such as history, literature, philosophy and languages; the Norwegian religious 
education model holds that a separate religious education subject is better suited to reach this 
objective.  
I will assess these models in view of two criteria of evaluation: normative 
considerations and considerations of effectiveness. In light of these considerations, I argue 
that although each model has its merits, they are both problematic because they in different 
ways fail to balance the need for exposure to religious and life-stance diversity on the one 
hand with sufficient neutrality towards different religions and life stances and human rights 
provision protecting the freedom of religion and belief on the other.  
4 
 
That being said, I regard the Norwegian religious education model as the more 
promising, despite its shortcomings. I will therefore propose two improvements. I will argue 
that in order to maximize the potential for promoting tolerance, public education should 
include a separate religious education subject aiming to teach pupils to both in-depth 
knowledge of as well as experiential familiarity with religions and life stances. At the same 
time it is crucial that public education maintain sufficient neutrality towards religious and life-
stances groups.  
The article will proceed as follows. In section one I will clarify the use the concept of 
tolerance in this context and its relationship with exposure to diversity. In section two, I will 
set out the two criteria of evaluation - normative considerations and considerations of 
effectiveness. Sections three and four will consist of a discussion of the integrated French 
model and the Norwegian religious education model. Finally, in section five, I will present my 
own suggestions for improving the Norwegian model. 
 
Tolerance, knowledge and understanding 
In this section I will first explain my understanding of what it means to promote tolerance in 
public education. Next, I will explicate the connection between the exposure to diversity on 
the one hand and the potential for promoting tolerance on the other.  
 
Tolerance 
I will in this article understand tolerance in a rather broad manner. First, I identify the 
promotion of tolerance as teaching pupils that in specific cases it is important to show 
restraint and non-interference when encountering values, opinions or behaviour that they 
object to. This relates to a classical liberal understanding of tolerance requiring the tolerator to 
object to what is being tolerated. In addition, I will understand promoting tolerance as the 
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educational activity of encourage pupils to become open-minded towards and even gain 
positive regard for what is different from themselves, i.e. different religions and life stances. 
This last understanding no doubt challenges the core concept of the liberal understanding of 
tolerance. In an educational context however, when tolerance is considered a normative ideal 
and a virtue, this wider understanding is often included.7 Neither it is incongruent with an 
everyday use of the concept of tolerance. 
At the same time it seems clear that public education should not unconditionally 
promote tolerance for all values, opinions or behaviour advanced in the name of religions and 
life stances. Tolerance as a moral concept must include limits to the religious and life-stance 
diversity public education should promote tolerance for. How to identify this limit of 
tolerance is a challenge facing all types of normative activity, public education being no 
exception. This is a complex task and providing a clear answer is neither possible within the 
scope of this article nor necessary for a useful discussion of the topic at hand. I will 
nevertheless argue that public education should be careful about limiting the promotion of 
tolerance only to so-called reasonable religions and life stances. The main reason is that by 
limiting the scope to reasonable diversity we run the risk of marginalizing and alienating 
religious persons and groups in our midst who, even if they do not share the ideal of a liberal 
political order, otherwise have the disposition to abide by the law or engage in legitimate 
political participation. 
 
Exposure to Diversity and the Promotion of Tolerance 
I will defend the claim that exposure to religious and life-stance diversity through public 
education is a useful means for promoting tolerance. This position rests on one basic 
argument, which can be termed the knowledge and understanding argument. This argument 
holds that exposure to religions and life stances is crucial for us to acquire knowledge and 
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understanding of our fellow citizens’ values and beliefs, and that such knowledge and 
understanding is beneficial for the promotion of tolerance.8 The core of this argument can be 
broken down to three causal links. The first link suggests that exposure to diversity benefits 
the acquisition of knowledge about this diversity. One could object to this link by arguing that 
exposure to religious and life-stance diversity does not automatically increase knowledge, and 
that exposure on the contrary can create misunderstandings and confusion. This is evidently 
true, but the objection seems to apply primarily when teaching is inadequate, and not when it 
is adequate and well-functioning, and the strength of the objection rests upon the assumption 
that the former state of affairs is the more prevalent in public education. That assumption 
must be mistaken, and in this regard it may be useful to bear in mind that the alternative to 
exposure to religions and life stances in public education is not the absence of it, since both 
media and other social settings are sources of such exposure. Given that religions and life 
stances at least in the media, frequently are characterized in a way that tend to stereotype or 
caricature them, it seems reasonable to assume that if public education teaches about religions 
and life stances, all things considered, it contributes to and secures a higher level of 
knowledge about these religions and life stances, than if it does not.  
The second link connects knowledge with understanding and claims that the more 
knowledge one acquires about other religions and life stances, the better are the chances of 
understanding what it means to belong to another religion or life stance. By understanding I 
include a sense of identification with others as in being able to imagine how it is to be 
someone else. Against this claim, one could argue that even if the knowledge transmitted is 
adequate and sufficient, it may nevertheless create hostility and revulsion instead of 
identification and understanding simply because the differences revealed are so considerable. 
Admittedly, in some cases adequate knowledge may still lead to hostility. This critique, 
however, seems to apply more to extreme or intransigent persons or groups, where 
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understanding and tolerance may not even be desirable, and less to the more moderate 
majority of religions and life stances.  
Finally, the third link connects understanding with tolerance, and claims that properly 
understanding others also makes it more likely that we come to tolerate them, than if we do 
not. This link rests upon the intuitive assumption that if we are able to attain a certain 
identification with others, we are more likely to realize both that in significant ways they are 
similar to us, but also that they are unique individuals worthy of respect, and that this 
realization makes us more disposed to putting up with or being more open-minded towards 
them. 
 
Criteria of Evaluation 
The point of departure for the discussion of the two models in the two following sections will 
be two criteria of evaluation. The first criterion involves normative considerations. This 
criterion addresses what specific means of promoting tolerance for diversity that should be 
considered desirable or undesirable from a general ethical perspective, as well as from a 
human rights perspective.9 Under a general ethical perspective, one could include a number of 
considerations. I will here focus on the ideal of neutrality or impartiality. By neutrality or 
impartiality I mean the ideal that the state should not favour or take sides between citizens’ 
conceptions of the good.10 In this context, considerations of neutrality or impartiality may 
evaluate whether a given model of religious education happens to favour a particular religion 
or life stance through its curriculum or by way of educational methods. Under a human rights 
perspective I will take into consideration central human rights provisions protecting the 
parental right as part of the freedom of religion and belief. I will focus on article 18 of the 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter CCPR) and 
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article 9 as well as article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECHR).  
The second criterion is instrumental and involves considerations of effectiveness. This 
criterion means considering which of the outlined models is potentially the most effective in 
terms of promoting tolerance for religious and life-stance diversity. This criterion is closely 
related to the knowledge and understanding argument accounted for above, in the sense that 
the evaluations will be guided by considerations of how exposure is necessary to acquire 
knowledge and understanding of religions and life stances, and that this is beneficial for the 
promotion of tolerance. It is important to isolate this criterion because this allows us to 
examine how different ways of organizing exposure to diversity play out in relation to the 
objective of promoting tolerance.  
Separating these two sets of considerations is done for analytical purposes, and is not 
meant to conceal the fact that they often are closely related. Sometimes normative 
considerations directly influence the choice of model for structuring exposure to religions and 
life stances by placing restrictions on a model that otherwise could have been effective. In 
other cases, normative considerations may undermine directly the effectiveness of a given 
model already implemented. If a religious education model is questionable or controversial 
from a human rights perspective, or is considered to violate standards of neutrality, such a 
model is likely to lose needed support from parents and pupils. This lack of support may 
consequently weaken the effectiveness of that model with respect to promoting tolerance. One 
can also imagine that the normative problems with a particular model are so considerable that 
an extensive exemption regime must be established to make it permissible, which thereby 
reduces its potential for promoting tolerance.  
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The Integrated French model   
According to the integrated French model, knowledge of religion is important in order to 
develop understanding and tolerance among religious groups.11 The imparting of 
educationally relevant knowledge of religion follows a religious studies approach and 
knowledge is to be integrated in other subjects or programs such as history, literature, 
philosophy and languages, rather than taking place in a separate religious education subject. 
The integrated model is currently being implemented in the French educational system. This 
process is the result of a quite recent and significant strategy change prior to which there was 
very little reference to religions in public education.12 The core argument for not teaching 
about religion in public schools was that in order for the state to treat all its citizens equally, it 
should be neutral towards all religions. This requirement implied that the public sphere, 
including public schools, should as far as possible be kept free of any religious symbols and 
religious expressions. This argument was connected to and supported by the laïcité principle. 
The laïcité principle has been a defining feature of French history, society and politics which 
holds that religion belongs to the private sphere and the state therefore should be neutral 
towards religion. The laïcité principle, however, is not a thing of the past and the present 
solution of integrating knowledge about religions into an already existing subject should also 
be seen to a large extent as a requirement of neutrality inherent in the policy of laïcité. An 
outline of the background for the integrated model will explain the justification for the 
strategy change in more detail.  
Since the 1980s there has been a public discussion in France concerning the negative 
consequences of the absence of knowledge of religions among French pupils. Many educators 
have even spoken of a crisis in public education in the sense that teachers have found it 
difficult to teach a number of literary, historical, philosophical or artistic topics because the 
students were unfamiliar with necessary religious cultural references.13 As a consequence, 
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some instruction in religion was introduced within school subjects in secondary schools from 
1996. An opinion poll from 2000 showed that there was consensus in the population around 
three principal objectives for improving the status of teaching about religion; 1) to offer 
access to the cultural heritage and its symbolism, 2) to develop education of tolerance and 3) 
to promote understanding of the contemporary world. In light of these objectives, additional 
steps were made in 2001 when philosopher Régis Debray was given the task on behalf of the 
Minister of National Education of investigating the state of teaching about religion in French 
schools. In 2002, the report “L’enseignement du fait religieux dans l’École laïque” [The 
teaching of religious facts in the lay school system], the so-called “Debray Report,” was 
published, proposing that teaching about religion be strengthened.14 15 The report 
recommended and reaffirmed the earlier position, in which teaching about religion in public 
schools in France should not take place in a special religious education-subject, but rather be 
integrated into other subjects or programs such as history, literature, French and philosophy. 
In the wake of the “Debray Report”, the religious dimension in different subjects has been 
given more weight and focus. Texts with religious content being studied in literature classes, 
religious and philosophical concepts as well as authors and philosophers dealing with such 
concepts put on the agenda in philosophy classes, and the inclusion of historical dimension of 
specific religions in history classes illustrates this.16 In addition, strengthening of teacher 
training concerning religion and the establishment of the European Institute for the Study of 
Religion (IESR) was a result of Debray’s recommendations.  
I will now discuss the integrated French model in light of normative considerations. In 
France, as we have seen, state neutrality to religion is a fundamental principle in public 
education in general. This ideal of state neutrality should also be seen as the main justification 
for the integrated model in particular. Several related arguments support this. First, as Debray 
himself argues, through avoiding a special religious education subject, the integrated model 
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will function as a safeguard against confessional forces taking gradually control over religious 
education.17 Second, by integrating religious topics in already existing subjects, teachers can 
more easily avoid controversial questions about religious truth or the spiritual dimension of 
religious life, as well as potential conflicts in the classroom following such questions. Thirdly, 
such a model evades the use of engrossing educational methods which naturally belong to a 
special religious education subject, and which may be problematic from a neutrality and a 
human rights point of view.  
These arguments are well founded, but even though an integrated model per se is 
easier to harmonize with neutrality and human rights’ considerations, this does not mean that 
these considerations by any means require such a model. Human rights provisions seem to be 
less restrictive on the presence and organization of religion in public education than the laïcité 
principle. The General Comment No. 22 § 6 to the CCPR, article 18, states that instruction in 
subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics is permissible if it is given in a 
neutral and objective way.18 Whether this requirement is fulfilled surely does not depend on 
whether knowledge about religion is given in a separate subject or integrated in other subjects.  
There is also a feature pertaining to an integrated structure which may be problematic 
from a neutrality and a human rights perspective. The curriculum of the integrated French 
model shows that some world religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, are either treated in 
passing, or entirely left out of public education.19 Even though some of this could be 
amended, it identifies a general problem: that some religions are not easily integrated because 
they do not naturally fit into other subjects’ curricula, all of which have their own agenda.20 It 
could be argued that this highly selective representation of religions in various subjects 
actually favours some religions and discriminates against others. I agree with Willaime21 that 
for national, cultural and historical reasons, not all religions should be granted an equal 
amount of time. Neither is this required by a viable ideal of neutrality, nor by the European 
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which states that this question falls within the State's margin 
of appreciation in planning and setting the curriculum.22 Without attempting to draw any 
conclusions here, one may nevertheless question whether the marginal treatment, or even 
complete exclusion, of major religions in curricula and teaching goes too far and thereby fails 
to fulfill the requirement of neutrality both as an ethical norm and as a requirement for 
permissible religious education from a human rights perspective.  
Based on considerations of effectiveness, I will present two arguments in favour of the 
integrated French model before turning to the objections. The first argument sees the 
integrated model in conjunction with the conceptualization of religion as a social fact. 
Regarding religion as a social fact implies a scientific approach to and an “outside 
perspective” on religion as a phenomenon covering all possible areas of human experience. 
Applied to public education, this means that a multitude of aspects of religion should be 
included in the teaching activities, and that the integrated model where several subjects take 
on this responsibility is well suited to accommodate this perspective. Based on this 
perspective, Bertram-Troost and Miedema argue that the integrated French model in fact 
widens the scope of teaching about religion instead of limiting it. If successful, the integrating 
approach gives pupils knowledge and understanding of different religions as they play out in a 
social and cultural context, thus benefiting the promotion of tolerance. 23  
The second argument is connected to the ideal of neutrality, and is based upon the 
view that integrating knowledge about religions in already existing subjects is less 
problematic from both a neutrality and a human rights point of view, than having a special 
subject designated for this purpose. Subsequently, if the integrated model is perceived as 
neutral and impartial, this has positive effects on the promotion of tolerance as well; if pupils 
and parents regard public education as treating them and their religion fairly vis-à-vis others 
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and without prejudice, they are more likely to keep an open mind and develop a positive 
attitude towards school policies of teaching tolerance.  
Although these arguments in favour of the integrated French model are significant, the 
model also faces problems. I will now discuss what I see as the most serious one in relation to 
the promotion of tolerance: This problem is connected to the inadequate contemporary 
perspective on religion. Even though the integrated model represents an improvement to the 
previous situation with only a limited presence of religion in public education, the 
contemporary perspective is still not sufficiently secured. Although integrating knowledge 
about religions in for instance literature, history or philosophy classes does not rule out a 
contemporary perspective, the integrated model seems to make it difficult to convey how 
religion is interpreted and understood as a living source of faith and morality by its adherents 
in present-day society. It seems as if relevant issues which are essential to understand the 
contemporary religious landscape are either marginally treated or left out because they are not 
naturally a part of other subjects’ curricula. This can be illustrated by the predominance of the 
historical perspective on religions in French schools. This is partly the case for Christianity, 
but almost entirely so for Islam and Judaism. Illustrative is also, as mentioned above, that 
Hinduism and Buddhism, present in contemporary French society, but marginally treated in 
public education. Based on the knowledge and understanding argument, an inadequate 
contemporary perspective is disadvantageous to the promotion of tolerance in public 
education because it limits pupils’ ability to understand their fellow citizens’ values and 
beliefs. It is a mistake to believe that by avoiding issues concerning the role of religion today, 
some of which may be controversial, public education does not convey a message about these 
issues to the pupils and to society. The problem is that the message may be that religion is of 
secondary importance in modern society, which in case means that the schools have failed to 
convey the fact that religions plays a profound role in many people’s lives. The message may 
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also be the opposite; religion is considered too important in the sense that it is too precarious 
or delicate to discuss in public education. Either way, it limits the acquisition of knowledge 
and understanding and thereby the potential for promoting tolerance. 
I think that it is beneficial and perhaps even indispensible for promoting tolerance in 
public education that public education is neutral towards different religions, but I do not think 
it is sufficient. Neutrality per se does not contribute to the acquisition of the knowledge and 
understanding necessary to promote tolerance. It seems therefore that the integrated French 
model goes too far in its ambition to secure neutrality, since these values are interpreted and 
practiced so as to exclude socially relevant knowledge about religions from public education. 
The cultural and constitutional restrictions imposed by the laïcité principle, woven together, 
threaten to undermine the potential to develop the necessary understanding of these religions, 
and consequently the ability for public education to promote tolerance for religious diversity 
may also diminish. 
 
 
The Norwegian Religious Education Model 
The second model to be considered is the Norwegian religious education model, materialized 
in the RLE subject (“Religion, livssyn og etikk” [“Religion, Life Stance and Ethics”]).24 This 
subject is, like the integrated French model, based on a religious studies approach. Unlike the 
French model, however, the Norwegian religious education model holds that tolerance for 
diversity is best fostered in a separate religious education subject. Another difference is that 
the Norwegian model provides pupils not only with comprehensive knowledge about a variety 
of religions and life-stances, but also ensures that they become familiar with what it means to 
adhere to these religions or life stances. The Subject Curriculum of the RLE subject states that 
“Knowledge about religions and life stances and about the function these have both as 
15 
 
traditions and as sources of faith, moral and interpretations of life are central to the subject”.25 
This means that a traditional knowledge based teaching, although important, is not sufficient 
to reach this goal. In addition, the use of “varied and engrossing work methods […] in 
presenting all aspects of the subject” is also required.26 Knowledge of aesthetic elements such 
as music, songs, art and architecture as well as religious holidays and rituals are included 
through various competence aims, thus expressing the experiential dimension as an integral 
part of the subject.27 The aim of giving pupils an experiential familiarity with religions and 
life stances is underpinned by the emphasis on the contemporary perspectives throughout the 
Subject Curriculum, illustrated by the focus on “how religions and life stances are interpreted 
and practiced in the world and in Norway today”.28 The contemporary perspective is also 
clearly present in the text-books used in public schools. The RLE subject is mandatory, but 
there is a limited right to exemption from those parts of the subject which parents (and pupils 
above the age of 15) perceive to be either “practice of other religions or adherence to other 
religions or life stances, or, as they on the same ground perceive to be offensive or 
demeaning”.29 One cannot be exempted from knowledge of the different parts of the subject. 
Hence, one cannot be exempted from the subject as a whole.30  
Let us now consider how the Norwegian religious education subject comes out of a 
normative evaluation. The aim of giving pupils an experiential familiarity with religions and 
life stances, partly by the use of varied and engrossing educational methods is potentially 
problematic. There is a risk that the combination of educational aims and methods in 
educational practice may cross the line towards indoctrination, which is both ethically 
undesirable and from which citizens are protected from through freedom of religion or belief 
in both the CCPR and ECHR.31 It is precisely because of these dangers that the Subject 
Curriculum and in the Education Act stress caution in the use of engrossing educational 
methods, emphasize that proselytizing is not permitted, guarantee that information about 
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exemption rights and the content of teaching is given annually, and as an additional safety 
measure, grant limited exemptions rights.32 In light of these safety measures, the Norwegian 
religious education model would seem to be on safe ground concerning both questions of 
neutrality and human rights standards.  
I find this conclusion to be slightly premature for two reasons. First, despite these 
efforts, the Norwegian religious education model fails to draw a sufficiently clear picture of 
what actually should go on in religious education classes. The obligation to provide annual 
information about exemption rights and the content of teaching is vague and unspecific and 
says little about when and how controversial methods are to be used, and more precisely what 
they contain. This vagueness gives the schools too large a scope of action and a too extensive 
margin of appreciation in the sense that, in practice, it is largely up to the local schools and 
teachers to make assessments concerning, for instance, the proper use of educational methods; 
in this respect, local traditions tend to prevail. There is, in other words, a high degree of 
unpredictability for parents and guardians as to the “when” and “how” concerning the use of 
the educational methods in question. According to the UN Human Rights Committee in the 
case of Leirvåg et al v Norway of November 200433 (hereinafter Leirvåg case) concerning the 
KRL subject, it was the difficulty for parents seeking exemption to distinguish the teaching of 
religious knowledge on one hand from the promotion of religious practice that caused a 
violation of article 18.4 of the CCPR, thus failing to respect “the liberty of parents […] to 
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions”.34 This unpredictability persists, despite the measures which have been 
undertaken.  
Second, we must consider the RLE subject with regard to the national educational 
system as a whole, and particularly in combination with the value basis of public education. 
This is especially relevant since the RLE subject emphasizes giving pupils an experience of 
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other religions and life stances through the use of engrossing educational methods. Since 
these are potentially problematic aspects of the subject, strict limits are placed upon the value 
basis of public education as expressed in laws and regulations.35 The Core Curriculum 
unequivocally and repeatedly states that the education shall be based upon Christian and 
humanistic values, and the recently adopted objects clause of the Education Act §1.1 holds 
that “teaching should be based on basic values in Christian and humanistic heritage and 
tradition, such as respect for human dignity and nature, freedom of conscience, neighborly 
love, forgiveness, equality and solidarity, values which also are expressed in other religions 
and life stances and which are anchored in human rights.”  
The question we must ask is whether the value basis, which also encompasses the RLE 
subject, is sufficiently neutral towards religions and life stances as well as compatible with 
central human rights provisions protecting the freedom of religion and belief. If it is not, the 
desirability of the RLE subject will be affected as well. It is difficult to predict whether the 
(material) changes made in the objects clause will be substantial enough to meet human rights 
standards. This depends to a large extent upon the procedural side of the matter (i.e. how the 
exemption regime in fact will be practiced). In the Folgerø case, where the European Court of 
Human Rights in a Grand Chamber judgment held by nine votes to eight, that the KRL 
subject had been in violation of article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. As we have seen, the General Comment nr. 22 to article 18 of the CCPR, does 
not imply that compulsory religious education is unacceptable, but requires that it should be 
delivered in a neutral and objective way in order to be acceptable. The problem, from a 
neutrality perspective, is that the Core Curriculum in particular, but also in part the objects 
clause gives pride of place to certain conceptions of the good by identifying the values on 
which education is based upon as “Christian and humanistic.” Other religions and life stances, 
in contrast, remain unspecified and are only regarded as also expressing these values. In my 
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opinion, there is still reasonable doubt as to the question of whether Christianity and 
humanism, by their privileged position, can be considered favoured in public education.36 The 
neutrality deficit of the value basis and the potential human rights problems thereby throw a 
“hegemonic shadow” on the RLE subject too.  
Based on considerations of effectiveness, the Norwegian model seems to have much 
going for it, even if it also faces certain problems. I will discuss this in the following. The 
Norwegian model aims to give pupils thorough knowledge about a range of religions such as 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Baha’i, as well as secular life 
stances. In addition, the RLE subject gives pupils some experiential familiarity with the role 
these religions and life stances can play in the lives of the believers is and that the use of 
engrossing educational methods is vital to reach this objective. Based on the knowledge and 
understanding argument, this approach has the potential to promote tolerance, because it 
enables all pupils, both those affiliated with majority and minority religions and life stances, 
to identify somewhat with the adherents of other religions and life stances. I will also argue 
that these ambitions are better secured in a special religious education subject. It is difficult to 
imagine how to fulfill the goals of instilling both thorough knowledge of and experiential 
familiarity with different religions and life stances if these goals are to be incorporated in 
other subjects, since each have its own agenda and specific educational methods.  
At the same time, focusing on the experiential dimension through the use of 
engrossing educational methods presents certain challenges, not only from a normative, but 
also from an effectiveness perspective. One main challenge in this regard is connected to the 
dangers of stereotyping. It is not unknown that by emphasizing for instance the aesthetic 
dimension, different forms of exotisms become tempting educational devices, which in turn 
may overemphasize the differences between religions and life stances.37 If that is the case, 
misrepresentations and the confirmation of stereotypes and perhaps even prejudice may be the 
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consequence, which would inhibit genuine understanding and consequently reduce the 
potential for promoting tolerance. The RLE subject is unquestionably ambitious in its 
approach to religious education, and it requires highly competent teachers that have been 
properly trained to teach the details of religion and life stances, and to be cautious and 
balanced in the use of engrossing educational methods.  
On the one hand, the national educational authorities seem to have taken this 
responsibility seriously, and that these risks and pitfalls are avoided through the course of 
teacher training and by pointing out in the Subject Curriculum that caution is to be used in the 
choice of methods.38 On the other hand, there are also recent signs that point in the opposite 
direction; teacher training in RLE is, from 1 August 2009, no longer a compulsory part of the 
general teacher training program. Given the importance of knowledgeable teachers and the 
fact that many RLE teachers today do not have sufficient training in religions and life stances, 
this development is questionable.  
Another challenge is the problem of sufficient neutrality. As we discussed in the 
previous section, the Norwegian religious education model faces challenges from both a 
neutrality and a human rights perspective. The problem was not primarily the religious 
education subject per se, but that the Core Curriculum and the objects clause favoured the 
Christian and humanistic tradition and that this neutrality deficit threw a “hegemonic shadow” 
over the RLE subject. The argument is if this subject is perceived by many adherents to 
minority religions and life stances as partial and problematic, this will reduce the ability of the 
RLE subject to foster tolerance. If pupils and parents do not regard public education as 
treating them and their religion fairly vis-à-vis others, they are less likely to keep an open 
mind and develop a positive attitude towards school policies of teaching tolerance. In 
addition, the chances that many pupils chose not to participate in parts of the subject may 
increase and also considerably reduce its ability to promote tolerance.39  
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Two proposals 
With the Norwegian model as a point of departure, I will in this section present two proposals 
for a religious education subject that I find to be particularly called for, and which I think will 
be more beneficial in promoting tolerance for diversity. The first addresses the need for a 
sufficiently neutral value basis, and the second suggestion calls for the separation of 
engrossing educational methods from ordinary classes. 
By a sufficiently neutral value basis I mean a value basis which gives no pride of place 
to specific religions or life stances, or which expresses no exclusive connection between 
specific religions and life stances and the school in either educational laws, regulations or 
subject curricula. The laïque foundations of the French educational system are sufficiently 
neutral in this respect; the Education Act and the Core Curriculum of Norwegian public 
education are not. I will not attempt to spell out such revision here, but simply suggest that the 
aim of these revisions should be guided by the aspiration that the value basis should express a 
“respectful non-identification” with religions and life stances. 40 As mentioned previously, it is 
reasonable to assume that if the value basis, which encompasses all school subjects, is 
generally considered fair and impartial, the religious education subject is also more likely to 
be perceived as fair and impartial. This is a trivial, but important and often neglected point. A 
sufficiently neutral value basis will benefit the promotion of tolerance, because pupils and 
parents are more likely to keep an open mind, and develop a positive attitude towards school 
policies of teaching tolerance. 
The second point concerns the use of educational methods, and calls for the separation 
of engrossing educational methods from ordinary classes. I have argued that such methods 
give pupils an experience of the profound role of religions and life stances in many people’s 
lives. At the same time, we have seen that such methods can be problematic from both a 
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human rights and an ethical perspective. From a strict human rights perspective, some have 
argued that the preferable solution would be to avoid any educational method which could be 
perceived as engrossing to avoid any conflict with parental rights.41 The problem with such an 
approach from an effectiveness point of view is that it could weaken the desired experiential 
familiarity with other religions and life stances and thereby reduce understanding and the 
potential for promoting tolerance. I think that a more promising solution is to increase the 
transparency of pedagogical practices by, as clearly as possible, describing what these 
methods contain and when they will be used, and to unmistakably separate them from 
ordinary religious education teaching. This should be clarified in semester plans and weekly 
plans. Such parts of the subject may typically be visits to religious or life-stance communities 
and vice versa, or it may involve educational methods which entail singing, drawing or 
painting or dramatizations in religious education classes. I propose that only these easily 
identifiable parts of the education should be subject to exemption, and that all ordinary classes 
should be compulsory. Such separation will make organizing these exemptions less difficult 
to administer for the school administration and the teachers. In addition, it will be easier for 
the parents to ensure that their pupils are exempted in accordance with their preferences. This 
transparency will also build trust and improve school-parent/guardian relations in the sense 
that parents or guardians will see that their rights to make fundamental decisions concerning 
their children’s moral education are being respected.  
It can be argued that such a way of organizing religious education is overly rigid and 
pedagogically complicated to administer, and that in practice, it downplays the important 
experiential perspective vis-à-vis the Norwegian religious education model. This form of 
religious education, admittedly, is less flexible and requires serious planning from educational 
administrators and teachers, and indeed poses a considerable pedagogical challenge. I will 
nonetheless claim that the positive effects of increased predictability compensate for these 
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shortcomings. That the experiential dimension will be subject to a higher level of institutional 
control does not diminish the value of this proposal.  
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